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Abstract In a principalagent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard prob-
lems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents
intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across
societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trust-
worthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper
over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall
governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choos-
ing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These
results are consistent with the empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
All societies have to deal with moral hazard problems. But each society resolves such
problems in di¤erent ways; some rely more on trust, while others depend on heavy use
of governance and monitoring rules. In the late medieval period, for example, agency
relations in the Maghribi traders were characterized by the prevalence of trust: Despite the
many opportunities for agents to cheat, only a handful of documents contain allegations of
misconduct ...This is, however, not the case in Italy, where allegations of misconduct are
well-reected in the historical records(Greif 1993). In current times, the labor-management
relations in Japan depend on a high level of trust, while [t]he twentieth-century American
system of industrial labor relations, with its periodic massive layo¤s, book-length contracts,
and bureaucratic, rule-bound personal interactions, would seem the very model of low-trust
social relations(Fukuyama 1995, p. 218). In a sample of fteen developed economies, the
supervision intensities in UK, US and Canada are the highest, with an average over two
times as high as that of the rest in 1980 (Gordon 1994); in most of these countries the
monitoring intensity followed an upward trend from 1970s to 1990s in the manufacturing
sector (Vernon 2001). Why do societies di¤er in their usage of trust and monitoring? How
does it change over time? These questions are explored in this paper.
From a societys point of view, the interdependence between intrinsic trustworthiness and
extrinsic governance in mitigating moral hazard problems is quite obvious. If the technology
is so advanced that it costs very little to achieve perfect monitoring, the society may deem
unnecessary to invest in individual trustworthiness. In contrast, if there is a su¢ ciently
large supply of trustworthy individuals and there are easy ways to recognize them, the
society may not invest to improve on monitoring. Since both monitoring technologies and
cultivating trustworthy people are costly, most societies fall somewhere between these two
extremes, and their exact locations depend on the relative costs of inculcation, screening,
and monitoring.1 These costs are not only a¤ected by exogenous technical features, but
more importantly, also by the incentive structure that shapes the relevant resource allocation
decisions; both are crucial for understanding the relative usage of trust and monitoring over
time and across societies.
This paper formalizes these insights using a principal-agent model, where the distribu-
1Considerable resources are involved in setting up schools, religious institutions, not to mention the
time and resources spent by parents, to inculcate moral values in its people (Shavell 2002). Meanwhile,
monitoring is also costly: more than 70,000 U.S. companies spent more than $500 million on surveillance
software between 1990 and 1992, and that by 1990 more than 10 million workers were under electronic
surveillance (Kipnis 1996). As a result, both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are commonly used; see for
example Baron and Kreps (1999) and Nagin et al. (2002).
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tion of agent trustworthiness is endogenized through agentsskill investment choices. The
main ndings are as follows. Trustworthy agents need less monitoring and hence receive
higher incomes than non-trustworthy ones in a competitive labor market. Changes in the
relative cost of monitoring techniques a¤ect the returns of being trustworthy, where the
average trustworthiness declines as monitoring becomes cheaper because parents anticipate
that trustworthiness will be less rewarded. The overall governance cost, however, may be
driven up by cheaper monitoring technologies, which crowd out too much trustworthiness
and hence force the society to rely excessively on extrinsic incentives.2
The relative costs of using trust and monitoring, however, are not dictated by natural
laws. Instead, they are likely to be endogenously determined by resources spent in reducing
them. As it turns out in equilibrium, principals and agents have conicting interests in such
matters: Agents are better o¤ with higher trustworthiness and higher monitoring costs; in
contrast, principals always prefer cheaper monitoring methods, and they do not necessarily
benet from hiring more trustworthy agents. A natural implication is that principals have
strong incentives to reduce monitoring costs but much less to invest in agent trustworthiness,
while the opposite is true for the agents.
The result may seem puzzling at rst sight. If hiring trustworthy agents reduces gov-
ernance costs, then principals should necessarily benet from it; this is also the general
impression one gets from discussions on social trust. But there are two problems in such
an argument: it ignores the competition among principals and the endogeneity of agent
trustworthiness. As a standard result of competition, the rent from hiring more trustwor-
thy agents disappears in the equilibrium;3 principals gain only when the bottom agents are
more trustworthy, but then these agents have no incentives to invest in trustworthiness only
to bring free windfall to principals. In other words, any rent captured by a principal is at
risk of being bid away by ex post labor market competition and by ex ante investment of
2The experiences of American rms seem to be consistent with this result. The intensively monitored
workplace and the conict-ridden state of labor-management relations in many American industries are
held partly to blame for the low productivity and poor quality of American work(Mills 1994). Faced with
intense competition pressure from foreign rms, various high performance work practices relying more on
cooperation e¤orts from employees started to be adopted from 1980s (Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Cappelli
1995, Cappelli and Neumark 2001). But such a transforming process is slow and di¢ cult to sustain due
to insu¢ cient trust (Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 1994). Actually the
consequences of low trust have motivated lively discussions among the public and social scientists; see,
among others, Putnam (1995), Cook (2001), James (2002), and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005).
3The logic is similar in spirit to Beckers (1962) insight on rms reluctance to invest in the general
training of employees. In the light of this comparison, rmswillingness to invest in corporate culture (Rob
and Zemsky 2002, Kreps 1997) and employee identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2005) follows a similar logic as
their willingness to invest in rm-specic human capital.
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agents. The existence of labor market frictions may enable principals to capture some rent;
such a rent, however, is not only limited in value since it is bounded above by the degree
of frictions, but also temporary in possession because it is rooted in the shifting sand of
endogenous agent trustworthiness. In sharp contrast, the saving on governance costs due
to cheaper monitoring methods is immune to both hazards.
Since principals have quite di¤erent incentives from agents in the choice of governance
modes, which side has more weight in resource allocation becomes very important in shaping
the relative costs and hence the actual usage of trust and monitoring. This yields the
following cross-sectional variation: societies giving lower weights to the welfare of workers
when choosing governance modes rely more on extrinsic governance and less on trust.4
It is indeed supported by the empirical evidence (Esping-Anderson 1990, Gordon 1994,
Rubery and Grimshaw 2003): The collective labor power is negatively correlated with the
supervision intensity among developed economies; the US, UK, and Canada have the lowest
labor powers and the highest supervision intensities, while the opposite is true in Denmark,
Japan and Germany.5
These results provide a plausible explanation of how intrinsic trustworthiness and mon-
itoring intensities evolve over time and across societies, which is the main contribution of
this paper. The relative merits and costs of di¤erent governance modes are also investigated
in related studies. Shavell (2002) analyzes the relative e¤ectiveness of morality and law as
means of controlling conduct; Sobel (2006) and Greif (1997) compare informal relational
contracts with formal legal institutions in supporting cooperation. The emphasis of these
work is more on the static comparison among competing modes than their dynamic interac-
tions. Another strand of related literature shows that intrinsic motivation may be crowded
out by high power incentive schemes (Rob and Zemsky 2002, Kreps 1997), by public poli-
cies (Bar-Gill and Fershtman 2005), by legal institutions (Bohnet, Bruno and Huck 2001,
Huck 1998), and by explicit monitoring (Frey 1993). The current paper contributes to this
literature by endogenizing both the monitoring intensities and intrinsic motivation so that
their dynamic interactions, in addition to the usual one-way crowding out e¤ects, can be
4A discrete version of this result is that an individualist society tends to rely more on monitoring than
a group-oriented one. This is consistent with the distinct management styles in the United States versus
Japan, and in the two trader groups mentioned above: In a survey cited by then Secretary of Labor Ann
McLaughlin in 1988, only 9 percent of American workers felt they would benet from their companies
increased productivity compared to 93 percent of Japanese workers interviewed in a similar survey (Mills
1994). The social structure of the Maghribi tradersgroup was horizontal,as traders functioned as agents
and merchants at the same time,while agency relations were organized verticallyamong the Italian traders
in that merchants and agents constitute two distinct subgroups(Greif 1993).
5More details are in the working paper version (Huang 2006).
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studied.
In this paper, trustworthiness is essentially a trait or skill that enables the owner to resist
short-run opportunistic temptations and to maximize social welfare. This paper is thus nat-
urally linked with a growing stream of studies of social preferences and ethnic behaviors in
the economic literature. It is consistent with the extensive experimental evidence produced
over the past four decades on human behavior in social dilemmas, which demonstrates that
internalized trust is a common phenomenon; that it is at least in part learned rather than
innate; and that di¤erent individuals vary in their inclinations toward trust. (Stout and
Blair 2001). Results in this paper regarding the negative relationship between screening and
monitoring intensities and the positive relationship between screening and employee com-
pensation are empirically tested and supported using data from a representative national
employers survey in the US (Huang and Cappelli 2006). The theoretical side of the literature
is too vast to be surveyed here; in the following only recent and more closely related studies
are briey discussed. In a principal-agent framework with adverse selection, the e¤ects of
di¤erent specications of honest behaviors on the optimal contracts are studied in Alger
and Renault (2006, 2007); Sliwka (2007) analyzes the interactions between the prevalence
of ethic behaviors in society and an individuals choice of whether to conform to the ethic
norm; these papers take ethic types as given and hence do not endogenize their distributions
as in the current paper. Another strand of literature, in contrast, aims to study why people
acquire social preferences in the rst place. Frank (1987) explores whether an individual
wants to choose his own utility function that allows others-regarding elements; Güth and
Ockenfels (2005) study the endogeneity of moral preferences using the indirect evolution-
ary approach, which combines individual rational decision making with the evolutionary
approach of preference determination; and nally, Kaplow and Shavell (2007) examine how
a social planner would inculcate guilt and virtue in individuals to foster social welfare.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, a simple principalagent model is in-
troduced and then extended to costly screening for agent trustworthiness. The inter-
generational dynamics are analyzed in Section 3, where individual trustworthiness is en-
dogenized through parental investment. The nal section presents conclusions.
2 The Principal-Agent Model with Monitoring and Screen-
ing
A principal hires an agent to complete a project. The outcome is stochastic: If the agent
makes the appropriate e¤ort e, he produces h > 0 with probability p 2 [0; 1] and 0 with
probability 1  p; if the agent shirks, the probability of getting h is q 2 [0; 1), where q < p.
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The cost of making e¤ort e is c(e), while shirking involves no cost. We assume hp c(e) > hq
so that making e¤ort e is the social optimal choice.
There is a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0; 1], who are heterogeneous in their
predisposition to cooperate. Agent i has a degree of trustworthiness i  0 that measures
the amount of guilt he feels if he shirks, whether caught or not by the principal.6 The
cumulative distribution function of trustworthiness among agents is F () with support [0; A].
It characterizes the quality of the workforce in this economy.
Principals are identical with unit mass. The reservation utility of agents and the al-
ternative return for principals are normalized to zero. To reduce shirking, a principal may
screen potential job candidates before hiring and/or monitor the agent on the job. The
principal can nd out an agents trustworthiness i at some cost s  0. We rst analyze
the case with s = 0 where an agents trustworthiness is publicly observed, then proceed to
the more general case with s > 0.
A principal chooses monitoring intensitymi 2 [0; 1] for an agent with i; with probability
mi an agent who shirks is caught by the principal and paid nothing. The total monitoring
cost is mik, where k measures the unit cost of using monitoring technologies such as video
cameras in the workplace.
The payment to an agent with i has two components: one is the incentive pay wi that
will be forsaken if shirking is detected by the principal, and the other is the basic wage bi
that is independent of the agents performance.7 The agents utility is u(wi) + u(bi)  c(e)
when he makes e¤ort, and (1  mi)u(wi) + u(bi)   i if he shirks, where u(0) = 0, u0 > 0
and u00  0. We dene the governance cost Mi for an agent i as the sum of the monitoring
cost mik and the incentive pay wi, since both of which are meant to reduce shirking:
Mi  mik + wi:
2.1 The Basic Model: Zero Screening Cost
The time line of the game with zero screening cost is as follows. Principals announce
their incentive packages containing the incentive pay wi and the monitoring intensity mi as
well as the basic wage bi as functions of the agents perceived trustworthiness i. Agents
then match with principals. After the matching is nished, agents get the basic wage bi
6This specic modelling of cooperative predisposition follows from the experimental evidence in Palfrey
and Prisbrey (1997) and is widely adopted in the relevant literature (see, e.g. Huck 1998, Rob and Zemsky
2002). Modeling i as an intrinsic benet of cooperation such as warm glow does not a¤ect the results.
7A state-contingent wage scheme is less optimal here than a constant wage across states, since the
monitoring intensity will be chosen to deter shirking completely so that the usual role of state-dependent
wages for risk-averse agents is eliminated.
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and choose whether to make e¤ort or shirk. Principals then monitor agents, pay wi if no
shirking is found, and pay nothing if otherwise. The competitive equilibrium is reached
in this game when there is no further changing of partners, and once in a match, nobody
wants to deviate from their decisions. We solve the game backwards.8
Lemma 1 In any given match, the optimal incentive package (wi ;m

i ) is determined by
(3) and (4) below for i 2 [0; c(e)), and is (0; 0) for i  c(e). Given this incentive scheme,
all agents make e¤ort. Both wi and m

i k decrease in i and increase in k, so does the
governance cost Mi .
Proof. Given the incentive package (wi;mi) and the basic wage bi, an agent does not
shirk if u(wi) + u(bi)  c(e)  (1 mi)u(wi) + u(bi)  i. This is simplied to
miu(wi)
extrinsic incentive
+ i
intrinsic incentive
 c(e);
cost of e¤ort
(1)
where an agent wont shirk if the sum of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives is larger than the
cost of e¤ort. For agents with i  c(e); their intrinsic incentive i alone is high enough to
prevent shirking, so the principal would set both the monitoring intensity and the incentive
pay at zero.
For agents with i < c(e), the minimum monitoring level required to deter shirking is
mi  c(e)  i
u(wi)
: (2)
So if a positive monitoring level is ever chosen, the principal would get a prot Qi 
hp  wi  mik   bi; and her objective function is
max
wi
hp  wi   c(e)  i
u(wi)
k   bi:
The FOC w.r.t. wi for an interior solution is
u0(wi )(c(e)  i)k   u(wi )2 = 0: (3)
The SOC SOC  u00(wi )(c(e)   i)k   2u(wi )u0(wi ) < 0 holds since u0 > 0 and u00  0.
Plugging wi into (2), we get
mi =
c(e)  i
u(wi )
: (4)
8The qualitative results would not change if alternative combinations of schemes were used. For example,
whatever repeated interactions can do to mitigate the moral hazard problem is either type-revealing or
imposing extra extrinsic incentives, both of which are already represented by screening and monitoring in a
one-period relationship.
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The proof of comparative statics is relegated to the Appendix.
Since agents with higher i require lower governance expenditures, all principals prefer
to hire them; but then competition among principals would bid up the basic wage bi for
these agents. Given that principals are identical with a mass equal to that of agents, all
would end up earning the same prot in equilibrium. Let
  min
i2[0;1]
fig
denote the lowest trustworthiness among agents. An agent with  gets zero basic wage
since there is no competitive bidding for him. So his principal earns a prot
Q = hp M();
where M() is the corresponding governance cost for the bottom agent; Q increases in 
and decreases in k by Lemma 1.
A principal hiring an agent with i >  gets a prot Qi = hp Mi   bi; which must be
the same as Q in equilibrium. That is, she must pay a basic wage bi such that Q

i = Q

,
which yields
bi =M
() Mi . (5)
Note the basic wage is essentially a rent generated by the agents trustworthiness i, which
reduces the governance cost from M() to Mi . The total compensation for an agent is
Ii  wi + bi =M() mi k; (6)
which increases in both i and k based on Lemma 1.
When  = 0, principals have to incur the highest governance cost
M0 = w

0 +m

0k;
where w0  wi ji=0 and m0  mi ji=0 are respectively the maximum levels of optimal
incentive pay and monitoring intensity. The corresponding prot is
Q0  hp M0 ; (7)
in this case principals do not benet from agent trustworthiness at all. In contrast, when
 > 0, principals can capture a partial rent Q  Q0 =M0  M() > 0.
Once all principals earn an identical protQ, nobody wants to change agents anymore.9
Similarly, agents do not gain from changing principals either. The distributions of agent
income Ii , principal prot Q

0, and the governance cost M

i are illustrated in Figure 1. The
relevant results are summarized in the following proposition.
9The prot of a principal is actually maxfQ; hqg, where hq arises when the principal pays an agent zero
wage and incurs zero monitoring cost. So monitoring is chosen if and only if Q  hq; since Q  Q0, this
condition is true when Q0  hq, which is assumed.
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Figure 1: Principalsprot, agent incomes, and governance costs
Proposition 1 In the competitive equilibrium of the basic model, each principal chooses
the optimal basic wage bi in (5) and the incentive package (w

i ;m

i ) derived in Lemma 1 for
any agent with i; all agents make e¤ort. The agents income Ii increases in both k and
i, whereas all principals make an identical prot Q, which is decreasing in k, increasing
in , but independent of i.
Given an agents trustworthiness, principals adjust their monitoring intensities and in-
centive pays accordingly to save governance costs. Because of perfect competition between
principals, the cost saved is transferred to agents as a basic wage, leaving principals with
a prot they would have made when hiring the least trustworthy agents in the population.
In other words, principals do not benet from hiring agents with higher trustworthiness in
equilibrium, though they do gain when the bottom agents are more trustworthy since Q
increases in . In this sense, the bottom level of trustworthiness  serves as a public good
for all principals.
2.2 The Model with Costly Screening
An extension to the basic model is studied in this subsection, where the principal has to
pay a positive screening cost s to observe an agents trustworthiness. The xed screening
cost implies two alternatives for a principal: pay s and observe an agents trustworthiness
9
accurately, or pay nothing and get no information. Though screening is costly, it enables
principals to reduce governance costs by using more suitable incentive packages. This may
generate positive sorting in equilibrium, where screening principals are matched with more
trustworthy agents.10
The time line of this screening game is similar as in the basic model, with some ad-
justment in the matching process. Principals rst decide whether to screen or not. Those
who choose to screen announce their selection criterion b,11 the incentive package (wsi ;msi )
and a basic wage bsi for i  b. Those who do not screen would adopt a single incentive
package (wr;mr) for any agent hired, since all look the same to them. Agents then decide
where to apply for jobs. A screening principal screens job candidates, hires the rst one
with i  b and rejects others. A non-screening principal hires whoever comes rst. After
matching is nished, agents get the basic wage if any and then choose whether to make
e¤ort or shirk. Principals monitor agents, pay nothing if shirking is detected and pay the
incentive wages if otherwise. The competitive equilibrium is reached when all principals
stick to their screening choices, there is no partner-changing, and once in a match, nobody
wants to deviate from their decisions.
Again we solve the game backwards. When the labor market clears, the proportion
of agents working for non-screening principals must be equal to that rejected by screening
ones, which is F (b); this is also the proportion of principals who choose not to screen. Since
screening incurs a xed lump-sum cost, the optimization problem of screening principals
is exactly the same as in the basic model, and hence the same optimal incentive package
(wi ;m

i ) applies to an agent with i 2 [b;A]. Competition among screening principals
equalizes their prots, which in equilibrium would also be the same as the optimal prot
Qr made by all non-screening principals due to competition pressure from them. That is,
just as in the basic model, all principals earn the same expected prot Qr in equilibrium
regardless of their screening choices.
An agent with i  b works for a screening principal and gets a total income
Isi = b
s
i + w

i ;
where wi is in (3) and b
s
i is determined by
bsi  hp Mi   s Qr ; (8)
10A more general screening technology yields similar results (Huang and Cappelli 2006). Since the max-
imum reduction in the governance cost is M0 , a necessary condition for a positive mass of screened agents
is s < M0 .
11Since the screening cost s is the same regardless of the actual i while the potential prot strictly
increases in i, there must exist a threshold b such that only agents with i  b are hired after being
screened.
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the agent income Isi increases in i as before. Other agents will work for non-screening
principals and get wr . To make the marginal agent b indi¤erent between being screened or
pooled with others,
Is(b) = wr (9)
must hold. Since Isi increases in i while w

r is xed, agents with i  b indeed prefer to
work for screening principals while others not.
Given the incentive package (wr;mr) o¤ered by a non-screening principal, agents with
i  r make e¤ort while others shirk, where
r  c(e) mru(wr)
is determined by the non-shirking condition (1). Thus, from the principals perspective, a
non-screened agent shirks with probability F (r)F (b) ; he is caught and loses wr with probability
mr. So a non-screening principals expected prot is
Qr = (1  F (r)
F (b) )(hp  wr) + F (r)F (b) (hq   (1 mr)wr) mrk: (10)
Proposition 2 In the competitive equilibrium of the screening game, there exists a unique
level of trustworthiness b such that agents with i < b choose to work for non-screening
principals, whereas those with i  b work for screening principals; @b@s > 0 and @b@k < 0
hold. A proportion 1   F (b) of principals screen agents, hire only those with i > b, and
o¤er (wi ;m

i ) plus a basic wage b
s
i in (8); others do not screen agents and o¤er zero basic
wage plus a uniform incentive package (wr ;mr), which maximizes problem (10) and satises
(9). All principals make the same prot Qr, where
@Qr
@s > 0 and Q

r > Q

.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Note that the basic wage of an agent with i  b, who works for a screening principal,
can be rewritten as
bsi = b

i   (Qr  Q)  s;
where bi is the basic wage he gets in the basic model with zero screening cost; b
s
i < b

i holds
not only because it is the agent that ultimately pays the screening cost s, but also because
principals earn a higher prot Qr than before. So the positive screening cost increases the
prot of principals but reduces agent incomes. The intuition is that the positive screening
cost, a form of market friction, reduces competition among principals and hence enables
them to capture some rent generated by agents. Again, screening principals do not gain
from hiring agents with higher trustworthiness once i  b, while all principals do gain
when bottom agents are more trustworthy.
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3 Inter-Generational Dynamics: Endogenous Trustworthi-
ness
In this part we endogenize the distribution of i in society. Suppose principals and agents
live for one period, each raising a child to replace his role when he dies. The underlying
technologies remain the same over generations. All agent children are endowed with the
identical productive ability as their parents. Their intrinsic trustworthiness is zero at birth,
which can be improved by parental investment during childhood to maximize a childs
lifetime income minus the investment cost.
The sequence of events is as follows. In the beginning of generation n = 1; :::;1,
the distribution of ni is realized. Then the stage game with costly screening is played,
where the competitive equilibrium derived in Proposition 2 prevails. At the same time, the
agent ni inculcates trustworthiness n+1;i in his child, expecting him to get an equilibrium
income I(n+1;i) when the child becomes adult. The inculcation cost is C(n+1;i;ni)
where C(0;ni) = 0, C1 > 0, C11 > 0; C2 < 0, C12 < 0; here the parental trustworthiness
ni indicates the e¢ cacy of the inculcation process, and it costs nothing to retain the initial
zero trustworthiness. Then generation n+1 replaces the old one, and the sequence of events
goes on.
Since the pooling wage wr is independent of an individuals trustworthiness i while
the inculcation cost increases with i, there is no gain for a pooling agent to acquire any
i > 0. Hence, from the second generation onwards, any agents not screened must have zero
trustworthiness. An obvious implication is that the lowest level of trustworthiness among
future agents would never be positive, that is, n = 0 in generation n  2.12 Accordingly,
non-screening principals will o¤er an incentive package (w0;m0) and make a prot Q0 in
(7). Then screening principals also make Q0, and the extra gain Qr   Q0 captured in
the above static model is transferred back to agents. So principals do not benet from
agent trustworthiness once it becomes endogenous. Thus we have proved the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 For any generation n  2, any non-screened agent has zero trustworthiness
and gets income w0, while a screened agent gets a basic wage b(ni)   s and income
I(ni)   s, where b(ni) = M0   M(ni) and I(ni) = b(ni) + w(ni) following
(5) and (6) respectively. The principalsprot is Q0 as in the basic model.
12Similarly, no agent would have ni > c(e), since doing so yields the same income as having ni = c(e)
but incurs larger investment costs. We ignore the perverse case where  can be negative; even when it is
allowed, there exists a lower bound for , below which principals would choose zero monitoring and zero
wage.
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The objective function of a parent in generation n = 1; 2; ::: is maxfR(ni); w0g, where
R(ni)  max
n+1;i
I(n+1;i)  c(n+1;i;ni)  s (11)
is the return if he ever invests in n+1;i and his child is to be hired by a screening principal,
and w0 is the return of his best alternative, which is no investment and his child with
n+1;i = 0 is to work for a non-screening principal. Intuitively, if a parent ni chooses
to invest in his child, the resulting n+1;i must be high enough to enable the child to be
hired after being screened and earn an income of at least C(n+1;i;ni) + s+w0 to justify
the investment. Since R(ni) strictly increases in ni, there exists a unique threshold
trustworthiness e for every generation n such that
R(e) = w0: (12)
So descendants of families with 1i < e would have n+1;i = 0 for all generations n+1  2
and work for non-screening principals. Only those with ni  e would ever invest in their
children, whose optimal choices are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) There exists a unique optimal solution n+1;i  g(ni) to problem (11).
The transition function g(ni) is either equal to c(e), or strictly increasing in ni.
(ii) In the steady state, there exists a unique trustworthiness level c = g(c) 2 (0; c(e)]
for all agents from families with 1i  e if C122  0 and C112  0; others have zero
trustworthiness. Hence, in the steady state, a proportion   1   F (e) of agents have c,
where c increase in k if  m + wk > 0, and  increases in k but decreases in s.
(iii) When the elasticity of c over k is high enough, the steady-state governance cost
M(c) goes up when k is lower, contrary to the static result in Lemma 1.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This proposition suggests that when trustworthiness is endogenously determined, cheaper
monitoring technologies may increase the governance cost, which is in stark contrast to the
short run view in Lemma 1. The intuition is as follows. If monitoring is cheaper in the next
generation, the lifetime return of trustworthiness is lower, so fewer agents will invest in it
and those who do so would invest less in it; but when the overall level of trustworthiness
is lower, principals have to monitor agents more intensively. When the e¤ect of resulting
higher monitoring intensity outweighs that of a lower unit cost of monitoring, the total
governance cost goes up; this happens when the elasticity of trustworthiness over k is large
enough.13 A specic case is provided by the following example.
13The mechanism is in some sense similar to the familiar phenomenon that, when the demand is elastic,
a lower price often leads to a much higher demand and thus a higher total expenditure.
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Example. Suppose the utility function is u(w) = wz and the cost function is
c(n+1;i;ni) =
c(e)a   (c(e)  n+1;i)a
(1 + ni)b
;
where z 2 (0; 1], a 2 (0; 1) and b 2 R+.
When a < 1z+1 , the unique optimal choice is
n+1;i  g(ni) = c(e)  k
 1
1 a(z+1) (1 + ni)
 b(z+1)
1 a(z+1) ; (13)
where   (z(z+1)a) 11 a(z+1) :14 It is easy to check that g(ni) is increasing and concave in
ni and
@n+1;i
@k > 0: In any generation n+ 1, the governance cost is
Mn+1;i  mn+1;ik + wn+1;i
= (k(c(e)  n+1;i))
1
z+1 (14)
=
plug in (13)

1
z+1 (k a(1 + ni) b)
1
1 a(z+1) ; (15)
where   (1 + z 1)z 1z+1 : It is straightforward to see that @M

n+1;i
@k jn+1;i > 0 holds in (14)
when n+1;i is exogenous in the short run, while
@Mn+1;i
@k < 0 is true in (15) when n+1;i is
endogenously determined by k in the long run.
A social planner, when deciding on how to allocate resources in reducing monitoring,
screening, and inculcation costs, would take into consideration the dynamic crowding-out
and crowding-in e¤ects by the monitoring technology on agent trustworthiness. Individual
principals, however, do not necessarily internalize the negative externalities they impose on
agent incomes when allocating resources to reduce monitoring costs. In other words, they
tend to over-invest in monitoring technologies. The reason is that the prot of principals Q0
increases when monitoring is cheaper, but it does not change when inculcation or screening
costs are lower; in contrast, the incomes of agents drop in the former case, but increase
in the latter. So principals gain but agents lose when the unit cost of monitoring is lower;
agents benet from lower inculcation and screening costs, whereas principals are indi¤erent.
This conict of interests between principals and agents seems fundamental in determining
the basic incentive structure of a societys resource allocation choices between reducing
monitoring costs versus reducing inculcation and screening costs, and hence may shape the
long term trends and cross-sectional variations of trust and monitoring intensity.
14When a  1
z+1
, the marginal benet of investing in trustworthiness is ever increasing before c(e) is
reached so that n+1;i = c(e):
14
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between trust and monitoring in reducing
moral hazard problems in a principal-agent setting. Agent trustworthiness and monitoring
intensities are both determined by fundamental forces in society such as the costs of mon-
itoring and screening agents and the cost of inculcating trustworthiness; their long-term
trends and cross-sectional variation are thus shaped by how these relevant costs change.
While acknowledging the inuence of exogenous technical features on the cost reduction
process, we argue that an important role is also played by the inherent conict of interests
between principals and agents in equilibrium: principals benet from lower monitoring costs
but not necessarily from lower screening and inculcation costs, whereas the opposite is true
for agents. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper, trust declines and the monitoring
intensity increases over time; they may do so at faster rates in societies where the interests
of agents are weighed less than those of principals in the choice of monitoring schemes.
The overall governance costs, however, may be driven up by cheaper monitoring technolo-
gies, which crowd out intrinsic incentives and induce society to rely too much on extrinsic
ones. These results are indeed consistent with preliminary empirical evidence, though more
rigorous tests are needed in future research.
The main insights of this paper also carry on to situations with general market fric-
tions that give principals certain monopsony powers. The following results can be readily
obtained with similar arguments as in the text. Principals may capture a rent from agent
trustworthiness when there exist labor market frictions; the rent, however, is limited by the
degree of frictions, and more importantly, it again disappears once trustworthiness becomes
endogenous. Since labor market frictions increase principalsprots but reduce agent in-
comes, principals have less incentives to eliminate them, while the opposite is again true for
agents.
This paper can be extended in various directions to get a more thorough understanding
of relevant issues. For example, the resource allocation decisions on improving various gov-
ernance modes can be explicitly modeled in a bargaining or political economy environment.
The screening process can be eshed out and repeated interactions between principals and
agents may be added to better address potential problems associated with screening in a
diverse and mobile society. The identical producing ability of agents assumed in this pa-
per can also be relaxed to study the trade-o¤ or complementarity between investment in
cognitive and non-cognitive skills from the perspective of aggregate welfare. For instance,
if the di¢ culty in monitoring arises when higher cognitive abilities are involved, then the
thoroughness of screening and the combination of governance modes should vary across jobs
15
in some systematic way.
Appendix
Proof of comparative statics in Lemma 1 Based on (3) we get
w  @w

i
@i
=
 u0(wi )k
 SOC < 0;
m  @m

i
@i
=
 1
u(wi )
  u
0(wi )(c(e)  i)
u(wi )2
w =
by (3)
 1
u(wi )
  1
k
w
=
u00(wi )(c(e)  i)k   u(wi )u0(wi )
 u(wi )SOC
< 0:
Thus wi and m

i decrease in i, and so does the governance cost M

i  mi k + wi .
Both wi and m

i k increase in k while m

i decreases in k since
wk  @w

i
@k
=
u0(wi )(c(e)  i)
 SOC > 0;
mk  @m

i
@k
=  u
0(wi )(c(e)  i)
u(wi )2
wk =
by (3)
 wk
k
< 0;
@mi k
@k
= mi +mkk = m

i   wk
= (c(e)  i)[ 1
u(wi )
+
1
k
w] = (c(e)  i)( m) > 0:
So Mi also increases in k, where
@Mi
@k = m

i +mkk + wk = m

i > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 After re-arranging terms, the prot for non-screening principals
is
Qr = hp  wr  mrk   F (r)
F (b) (h(p  q) mrwr);
where r = c(e)   mru(wr). Since b is taken as given by an individual non-screening
principal, so is wr that is determined by (9) in equilibrium. The rst order condition with
respect to mr is
F (r)
F (b) wr + (h(p  q) mrwr)f(r)F (b) u(wr)  k = 0:
The second order condition
 f(r)
F (b) wru(wr)  (h(p  q) mrwr)F (b) f 0(r)u(wr)2 < 0
holds given f 0(r)  0 and h(p  q) mrwr > 0, which is true by (7) and footnote 10.
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Not surprisingly, the principals prot increases with b:
@Qr
@b = f(b)F (r)F 2(b) (h(p  q)  wrmr) > 0:
Since Qr(b = ) = Q; it is obvious that Qr > Q.
Now we prove the uniqueness of b and its relevant comparative statics. By denition ofb we have I(b) = wr(b), which can be written as
Qi (b) + wi (b) Qr(b)  s  wr(b) = 0 (16)
by plugging in (8). The rst derivative of LHS with respect to b is
@LHS
@b = @[Qi (b) + wi (b)]@b   @[Qr(b) + wr(b)]@b > 0
since the marginal gain of trustworthiness in an unconstrained maximization (measured
by the rst item) is larger than that in a constrained one (measured by the second item).
Intuitively, the non-screening principal, because of imperfect information, adopts a higher-
than-necessary wage and monitoring level for agent with b; this is a waste of resources
compared to the complete information case for the screening principal. Since LHS(b =
) =  s < 0 while @LHS@b > 0, there exists a unique threshold b such that (16) holds.
For the same reason as @LHS@b > 0, we get
@LHS
@k
=
@[Qi (b) + wi (b)]
@k
  @[Q

r(b) + wr(b)]
@k
> 0:
From equation (16) we get
@b
@s
=    1
@LHS=@b > 0;
@b
@k
=  @LHS
@k
=
@LHS
@b < 0:
Together with @Q

r
@b > 0, it is easy to see a principals prot Qr increases with s.
Proof of Proposition 4 The objective function is
max
n+1;i
M0  
c(e)  n+1;i
u(wn+1;i)
k   C(n+1;i; ni)  s; (17)
where wn+1;i is specied in (3). The rst order condition for an interior solution is
u(wn+1;i) + u
0(wn+1;i)(c(e)  n+1;i)w
u(wn+1;i)2
k   C1(n+1;i; ni) = 0; (18)
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where w  @w

n+1;i
@n+1;i
: Plugging (3) into (18) we get
k
u(wn+1;i)
+ w   C1(n+1;i; ni) = 0; (19)
which yields the unique optimal choice n+1;i  g(ni) 2 [0; c(e)] in each generation n when
the second order condition
SOC2   u
0kw
u2
+ w   C11 < 0
holds; when SOC2 > 0, then the marginal benet of investing n+1;i is increasing so that
n+1;i = c(e).
n+1;i is increasing in ni because
@n+1;i
@ni
=
 C12(n+1;i; ni)
 SOC2 > 0:
Its also increasing in k when  m + wk > 0 since
@n+1;i
@k
=
@mn+1;ik
@k
1
c(e) n+1;i + wk
 SOC2 =
 m + wk
 SOC2 :
When the trustworthiness level n+1;i is endogenous, the governance cost
Mn+1;i = w

n+1;i +
c(e)  n+1;i
u(wn+1;i))
k
may actually increase when k is lower, in contrary to the short run result. This happens
when the elasticity of n+1;i over k is high enough. After cancelling terms and plugging in
condition (3), we get
@Mn+1;i
@k
= (
@n+1;i
@k
k
n+1;i
)
 n+1;i
u(wn+1;i)| {z }
ks e¤ect on
agent trustworthiness
+
c(e)  n+1;i
u(wn+1;i)| {z } :
ks e¤ect on
short-run governance cost
It is negative when the elasticity is large enough: @n+1;i@k
k
n+1;i
> c(e)n+1;i   1. At the steady
state this condition becomes @c@k
k
c
> c(e) cc .
Furthermore, g(ni) is concave if
@2n+1;i
@2ni
=
SOC2C122(n+1;i; ni) + C112C12(n+1;i; ni)
(SOC2)2
 0
holds, which is true when C122  0 and C112  0. Since the transition function n+1;i 
g(ni) is increasing and concave in ni 2 [0; A], g(0) > 0 and g(A)  c(e), there exists a
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unique steady state trustworthiness level c such that c = g(c). Note that @c@k > 0 since
a higher k shifts up the transition function due to
@n+1;i
@k > 0.
Based on  = 1  F (e) and (12) we get
@
@s
=  f(e)@e
@s
= f(e)R0(s)
R0(e) = f(e)  1 C2 < 0;
@
@k
=  f(e)@e
@k
= f(e)R0(k)
R0(e) = f(e)m0  mi + @w0=@k C2 > 0:
So the proportion of agents with positive trustworthiness decreases in screening cost s while
increases in monitoring cost k.
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